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THE POSSIBILITY OF GOD
Clement Dore
I
In the Fifth Meditation, Descartes argues that "there is not any less repugnance
to our conceiving a God (that is, a Being supremely perfect) to whom existence
is lacking (that is to say, to whom a certain perfection is lacking), than to
conceive of a mountain which has no valley." And he draws the conclusion "that
existence is inseparable from Him and hence that He really exists. "I
The most charitable interpretation of Descartes's argument is, I think, the
following one:
(1) The concept of God is the concept of a supremely perfect being.

(2) The concept of existence is the concept of a perfection relative to God.
Hence
(3) the concept of God stands to the concept of existence as the concept
of a mountain stands to the concept of a valley, i.e., it is a conceptual
truth that God exists.
So
(4) God really exists.
Call this argument "At. It is possible to construct an argument which is
similar to Al for the conclusion that God's existence is logically possible. The
argument is relevant to the question whether God exists, because, if it is sound,
it supports premiss b) of the following modal argument for God's existence:
a) The concept of God is such that it is true in each possible world that
if God exists there, then he exists with broadly 10gicaF necessity there.
b) There is a possible world, W, in which God exists.
So
c) in W, God exists with broadly logical necessity. (From a) and b) by
modus ponens.)
But
FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY
Vol. 1 No.3 July 1984
All rights reserved.

303

304

Clement Dare
d) what is broadly logically necessary in one possible world is broadly
logically necessary in every possible world, including the actual world.

Hence
e) God exists in the actual world, i.e. God really exists.
1 have defended premisses a) and d) of this argument elsewhere. 3 And 1 have,
in the same work, defended premiss b). 4 However, the argument for b) which 1
am about to offer is new, and is, I think, superior in some respects to the former
defense of b).
II

The argument goes as follows:
(1) The concept of God is the concept of a supremely perfect being.
(2) The concept of logical possibility is the concept of a perfection

relative to God.
So

(3) the concept of God stands to the concept of logical possibility as,
e.g., the concept of a square stands to the concept of a figure which
has more sides than three, i.e., it is a conceptual truth that God is
logically possible.
Hence
(4) God really is a logically possible being. (I shall, for simplicity,
henceforth omit the qualifier "logically. ")
Now it may well look as if this argument (which 1 shall call "A2") is subject
to an obvious refutation, viz.: "Even if it is indeed the case that the concept of
God stands to the concept of possibility as the concept of a square stands to the
concept of a figure which has more sides than three, it does not follow that God
is really a possible being. For all that follows from the fact that it is a conceptual
truth that squares have more sides than three is that, if there are squares, then
they have more sides than three. (It is a conceptual truth that, say, centaurs are
creatures with the torso of a human being and the hind parts of a horse; but it
would surely be madness to maintain that this fact warrants us in believing that
there really are such creatures. All that follows from the envisaged conceptual
truth is that if centaurs exist, then they are creatures of the contemplated sort.)
And, by parity of reasoning, all that follows from the claim that it is a conceptual
truth that God is possible is that if God exists, then he is possible, i.e., it does
not follow that God really is possible. But premiss b) of the envisaged modal
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argument (call it "M"), must be construed as making the latter, stronger claim
or we must conclude that M is unsound. Hence, A2 is a failure."
But in fact this objection can be seen to be mistaken. 5 A conceptual truth-expressing sentence is such that we can give an explanation (and, indeed, a complete
explanation6 ) of our ability to know that it expresses a truth just in terms of the
concepts which it expresses (so that our knowledge that it expresses a truth need
not be based on observation). Moreover, it is the mark of a conceptual truthexpressing sentence that its being truth-expressing is explicable in terms of its
expressing precisely the concepts which it expresses. Thus, the explanation of
the fact that the conceptual truth-expressing sentence, "Squares are 4-sided
figures," expresses a truth has to do with the fact that it is (precisely) about
squares (and 4-sided figures) rather than some other objects. So the claim that
it is a conceptual truth that God is possible entails the claim that it is because
of the concept of possibility and the concept of God (and not some other being)
that the sentence "God is possible" expresses a truth.
But suppose that "God is possible" really does mean the same as "If God
exists, then he is (actual and hence) possible." This latter sentence (call it "<1>")
would continue to express a truth, no matter what proper names, nouns, or
definite descriptions we might substitute for "God": the envisaged sentence
expresses a conceptual truth. It follows that if "God is possible" really does
express a conceptual truth, then it does not mean the same as the contemplated,
ontologically sterile sentence, <1>. And it follows in tum that the fact that "God
is possible" expresses a conceptual truth entails that God really is a possible
being, i.e., that premiss b) of M is true in the requisite sense.
It is of note that similar considerations do not apply to "Squares have more
sides than three." Though this sentence expresses a conceptual truth, it is equivalent in meaning to the conditional sentence "If squares exist, then they have
more sides than three"; for this latter sentence does not express a vacuous truth,
i.e., it would express a falsehood under most substitutions of plural nouns and
definite descriptions for "squares." Hence, the fact that it is because of the
concept of a square that "Squares have more sides than three" expresses a truth
does not entail, in this instance, that it does not mean the same as the envisaged
conditional sentence. However, as we have seen, things are otherwise with "God
is possible." This sentence expresses a conceptual truth only if it is not equivalent
to <1>. But now it looks as if it does in fact express a conceptual truth. It looks,
then, as if A2 is sound.
Here someone may wish to argue as follows: "Let 'super-centaur' = DF 'a
broadly logically necessary centaur.'" This definition generates a necessary truth,
namely, that if a super-centaur exists, then it exists with broadly logical necessity.
So it is true in each possible world that if a super-centaur exists there, then it
exists with broadly logical necessity there. Hence, if M is a sound argument,
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then, given that super-centaurs are possible, super-centaurs exist. But consider
the concept of a possible super-centaur. It is because of this concept that the
sentence "Possible super-centaurs are possible" expresses a (necessary) truth.
But this sentence (call it "E") expresses a proposition which is equivalent to the
ontologically sterile proposition which is expressed by , Ifpossible super-centaurs
exist, then they are possible.' Otherwise, given the soundness of M, we can
construct a sound parallel argument which establishes that super-centaurs (and
a myriad of other such Gaunilo-type entities) really exist. But if E both expresses
a conceptual truth and means the same as the envisaged conditional sentence,
why shouldn't 'God is possible' be taken to mean the same as <!>?"
The answer is that the word "possible" in E functions as a (Quinean) logical
particle, i.e., E expresses a logical-and, hence, vacuous-truth, since it would
continue to express a truth, no matter what plural noun or definite description
we might place after the logical particle "possible" (so long as the sentence ended
with "possible.") It follows that the fact that E is truth-expressing can be explained
without referring to precisely the concepts which it expresses. And it follows in
turn that E does not express a conceptual truth and, hence, can plausibly be
construed as equivalent in meaning to the ontologically sterile (and vacuous
truth-expressing) sentence "If possible super-centaurs exist, then they are possible."
At this point, another objection may be raised: '''God' analytically entails 'a
possible omnipotent, omniscient and perfectly good, etc. being'. Hence, 'God
is possible' , means the same as the vacuous truth-expressing sentence' A possible
(etc.) being is possible', in which 'possible' figures as a logical particle, as it
does in E. And since the contemplated sentence expresses a vacuous truth, there
is no objection to its being translated into the vacuous truth-expressing conditional
sentence, 'If a possible (etc.) being exists, then he is possible.' But (3) of A2
is validly entailed by (1) and (2); and there is no reason to think that either of
these turns out false under the present analysis of 'God.' So it is false that if
'God is possible' expresses a conceptual truth, then it is not equivalent in meaning
to 'If God exists, then he is possible. '"
The reply to this objection is that (3) does not follow from (1) and (2) as,
e.g., p follows from p and q. Whether the concept of God stands to the concept
of possibility as the concept of a square stands to the concept of a figure which
has more sides than three, depends in part on what "God" means. And if "God"
has the meaning which is presently contemplated, then in fact it is false that the
envisaged analogy holds-since it is a conceptual truth that squares have more
sides than three; but it is not (given the present analysis of "God") a conceptual
truth that God is possible. Premisses (1) and (2) should be taken to establish an
incomplete case for (3), which can be overthrown, given that the meaning of
"God" is such that it is false that "God is possible" expresses a conceptual truth.
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In view of this consideration, A2 can be strengthened as follows:
(1) The concept of God is the concept of a supremely perfect being.
(2) The concept of possibility is the concept of a perfection relative to

God.
(2') The concept of God is not such that 'God is possible' expresses a
vacuous modal logical truth (i .e., it is not like the concept of a possible
super-centaur in that respect).
So
(3) it is a conceptual truth that God is possible.
Hence
(4) God really is possible.
But now why should it be thought that "God" does not analytically entail "a
possible being"? If there is no argument to the contrary, then A2 is much less
than compelling. However, there is in fact an argument which shows that the
contemplated analysis of the meaning of "God" is mistaken: Let us say that for
any value of X, "X has actual possibility" means that the sentence "X is possible"
(1) expresses a truth and (2) is not equivalent in meaning to any conditional
sentence. Then we can rephrase A2 as follows:
(1) The concept of God is the concept of a supremely perfect being.
(2) The concept of actual possibility is the concept of a perfection

relative to God.
So
(3) it is a conceptual truth that God has actual possibility.

Hence
(4) God has actual possibility.
Now it looks to be plainly false that all that this argument establishes is the
ontologically sterile conclusion that if God exists, then he is possible. For it
appears that what it shows, if it is sound, is precisely the opposite. (And if "God
is possible" does not mean "If God exists, then he is possible," then "God" does
not mean "a possible (etc.) being.") Hence, it looks as though the present
argument shows that A2 is after all sound.
Here someone may say, "The sentence, 'God has actual possibility' , is equivalent in meaning to 'A being such that it has actual possibility (etc.) has actual
possibility'; and this sentence expresses a vacuous truth, and, hence, there is no
reason to deny that it means the same as the ontologically sterile sentence, 'If
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a being such that it has actual possibility (etc.) exists, then it has actual possibility.'
Moreover, the latter sentence expresses a proposition which is compatible with
its being the case that 'God is possible' means 'If God exists, then he is possible.'
So the revised argument does not after all show that A2-cum-M have real ontological significance."
But the objection can easily be met. One reply to it is as follows: It is clear
that if "God has actual possibility" does not express a true proposition which is
incompatible with its being the case that "God is possible" means "If God exists,
then he is possible," then no sentence does. So my opponent is arguing in effect
that the concept of God is such that it is not possible to express a true proposition
which is incompatible with its being the case that "God is possible" means the
same as "If God exists, then he is possible." But this can be seen to be wrong.
Let "a C-concept" = DF "a concept of something, X, such that it is possible to
express a true proposition about X which is incompatible with its being the case
that 'X is possible' means the same as 'If X exists, then it is possible. '" And
consider the following argument:
(1) The concept of God is the concept of a supremely perfect being.
(2) The concept of a supremely perfect being is a C-concept.

So
(3) the concept of God is a C-concept.

Now
(4) if the sentence "God has actual possibility" does not express a true
proposition which is incompatible with its being the case that "God is
possible" means the same as "If God exists, then he is possible," then
no sentence does.
But
(5) if the sentence "God has actual possibility" means the same as "A
being which has actual possibility (and is omnipotent, omniscient and
perfectly good etc.) has actual possibility" (call this sentence "S"), then
the proposition which is expressed by the former sentence is not incompatible with its being the case that "God is possible" means the same
as "If God exists, then he is possible."
Hence
(6) "God has actual possibility" does not mean the same as S; so "God
is possible" does not mean the same as "If God exists, then he is
possible."
A second reply to the envisaged objection is this: Let us mean by "X has real
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actual possibility" that the sentence, "X has actual possibility," is (1) true and
(2) not equivalent in meaning to any ontoiogically sterile conditional sentence.
And consider the following argument:
(1) The concept of God is the concept of a supremely perfect being.

(2) The concept of real actual possibility is the concept of a perfection
relative to God.
Hence
(3) it is a conceptual truth that God has real actual possibility.
So
(4) God has real actual possibility.
What this argument shows is that "God has actual possibility" expresses the
non-ontologically sterile (non-conditional) truth that "God is possible" expresses
a non-ontologically sterile (non-conditional) truth. Or, at any rate, the contemplated argument establishes this unless "God" analytically entails "a being
which has real actual possibility (etc.)," in which case "God has real actual
possibility" is equivalent in meaning to the ontologically sterile, conditional
sentence "If a being which has real actual possibility (etc.) exists, then he has
real actual possibility. But now this criticism can be countered by a) introducing
the concept of X's having actual real actual possibility-i.e., of X's being such
that the sentence "X has real actual possibility" (1) expresses a truth and (2) is
not equivalent in meaning to any ontologically sterile conditional sentenceand b) pointing out that the concept of God stands to the concept of having
actual real actual possibility as the concept of a square stands to the concept of
a figure with more sides than three. It follows from this that "God has real actual
possibility" expresses the non-ontoiogically sterile (non-conditional) truth that
"God has actual possibility" expresses the non-ontologically sterile (non-conditional) truth that "God is possible" expresses a non-ontologically sterile (non-conditional) truth. And it would surely be preposterous to claim at this point that
"God" analytically entails "a being who has actual real actual possibility," so
that "God has actual real actual possibility" is equivalent in meaning to "If God
exists, then he has actual real actual possibility." And, as the regress that we
started on progresses, analytic entailment claims of the envisaged sort would
become more and more incredible, i.e., it would become more and more incredible that "God" has such an immensely bloated meaning.
Or would it? I am claiming that "God is possible," "God has actual possibility,"
"God has real actual possibility," etc. all express conceptual truths. And this
may give rise to the following argument: "Whenever it is a conceptual truth that
X's are Y's, this is because the term which stands for X's analytically entails
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the term which stands for Y's (or vice versa). Thus, it is a conceptual truth that
squares are four-sided figures only because 'squares' analytically entails' foursided figures'; it is a conceptual truth that bachelors are unmarried adult males
only because 'bachelors' analytically entails 'unmarried adult males', and so on.
And, by parity of reasoning, it is a conceptual truth that God is possible only if
'God' analytically entails 'possible being'; it is a conceptual truth that God has
actual possibility only if ' God' analytically entails 'being who has actual possibility'; and so on. But now if 'God' analytically entails 'possible being' then
'God is possible' is indeed equivalent to 'If God exists, then he is possible'
(since it means the same as the vacuous sentence, 'A possible (etc.) being is
possible'); and if 'God' analytically entails 'being who has actual possibility,'
then 'God has actual possibility' is indeed equivalent to ' If God exists, then he
has actual possibility' (since it means the same as the vacuous sentence, 'A
being who has actual possibility (etc.) has actual possibility'); and so on."
The reply is simply that there are conceptual truths which are expressed by
sentences in which the subject term does not analytically entail the predicate
term. "Socrates is a non-number" is an example, as is "Mail boxes are non-conscious." Surely both of these sentences express necessary, but non-vacuous (i.e.,
conceptual) truths, but just as surely "Socrates" does not analytically entail
"non-number" and "mail boxes" does not analytically entail "non-conscious."
And, closer to home, e.g., "Ronald Reagan is logically possible" expresses a
necessary,7 though non-vacuous, truth. (Surely "Ronald Reagan" does not mean
in part "logically possible being.") In short, my objector is overlooking the fact
that some conceptual truths are de re, rather than de dicto, necessary.
III

William L. Rowe has presented roughly the following parody of Al (my
Section I interpretation of Descartes's Fifth Meditation Argument):
(a) Let "minor deity" = DF "a being who possesses all properties
which are perfections relative to God, but only a modest degree of
perfections which vary in degree, such as knowledge, power and goodness."
Then
(b) the concept of a minor deity is the concept of a being who possesses
such properties.
But
c) the concept of existence is the concept of a perfection relative to God.
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So
d) the concept of existence stands to the concept of a minor deity as
the concept of a mountain stands to the concept of a valley, i.e., it is
a conceptual truth that minor deities exist.
Hence
e) minor deities really exist.
Call this parody "A 3". In my article "Descartes's Meditation V Proof of God's
Existence," I argued against A3 8 roughly as follows: "Since the concept of God
is such that if God exists, then it is logically impossible for any other being even
to come close to rivalling him with respect to the number and degree of his
perfections, the concept of a minor deity is, if God exists, logically incoherent.
Hence, if God exists, it is necessarily false that minor deities exist; and, since
necessary falsehoods cannot be conceptual truths, 9 it is false that it is a conceptual
truth that minor deities exist. (Premisses like b) and c) of A3 establish only an
incomplete case for conclusions like d), and one which can be overthrown if the
concept of their subject is logically incoherent.) But now there is no similar
criticism of AI available. So we should conclude that AI is a stronger argument
than A 3 , and, hence, that we can comfortably accept the former while rejecting
the latter."
However, this is not a successful defense of A I, for the following reason: If
A3 is sound, then minor deities exist and, hence, are logically possible. But my
"refutation" of A3 is based on the proposition that if God exists, then minor
deities are not logically possible; and that is logically equivalent to the proposition
that if minor deities are logically possible, then God does not exist. So if A3 is
sound, God does not exist. Hence, all that we are entitled to conclude at this
point is that if Al is sound, then A3 is not and vice versa.1O My point here can
be re-expressed as follows: It is circular to argue that (1) because we have
adequate reason to believe that AI is sound, we have adequate reason to believe
that God exists and, hence, that minor deities are logically impossible and (2)
because we can thus refute A3 , we have adequate reason to believe that AI is
sound.
It may appear that the way out of this difficulty is simply to point out a) that
both Al and A3 need to be strengthened by the addition of a premiss which
explicitly asserts, in the case of Aj, that God's existence is logically possible
and, in the case of A3 , that the same is true of minor deities, and b) that, since
we have a defense of the former premiss, namely, A2 , and no defense of the
latter one, we have adequate grounds for accepting Al while rejecting A3.
However, this is not an end of the matter. Consider the following, Rowe-like
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parody of A2:
(1) Let "minor deity" = DF "A being who possesses all properties
which are perfections relative to God, but only a modest degree of
perfections which vary in degree, such as knowledge, power and goodness. "

Then
(2) the concept of a minor deity is the concept of a being who possesses

such properties.
But
(3) the concept of possibility is the concept of a perfection relative to God.

Hence
(4) the concept of possibility stands to the concept of a minor deity as
the concept of a square stands to the concept of a figure which has more
sides than three, i.e., it is a conceptual truth that minor deities are
possible.
So
(5) minor deities really are possible.
This argument (call it "A4 ") looks to be just as cogent as A2 . But if it is, then
we cannot dispense with A3by claiming that, though there is adequate reason,
in the form of A2, to think that God is possible, we have no such reason to
believe that minor deities are possible as well.
At this point it will be convenient to return to my earlier attempt to defend
Descartes's argument (AI) vis-a-vis Rowe's parody of it (A 3 ). The central premiss
in that defense was the intuitive claim (call it "Cn that the concept of God is
such that it is a necessary truth that if God exists, then it is logically impossible
for any being other than God to rival him with respect to the number and degree
of his perfections. But now the following modification of that proposition (call
it "C2") is surely just as intuitive: The concept of God is such that it is a necessary
truth that whether or not God exists, it is logically impossible for any other being
to possess the number and degree of perfections which orthodox theists believe
that God possesses. II Maintaining that C]is plausible, while denying that C 2is
plausible as well, would be like maintaining, e.g., that it is true that nothing
which is a three-sided figure can, at the same time, be a square only if squares
actually exist, or (what is even more implausible) that nothing which does not
have the hind parts of a horse can be a centaur only if there actually are centaurs.
But since it follows from C2 that minor deities are logically impossible, regard-
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less of whether God exists, C2 entails that minor deities are logically impossible
whether or not Aj is sound. Hence, the critic of A3 does not need to assume
that Al is sound in order to establish that A3 is unsound. Moreover, since there
is no parallel criticism of Ail it is reasonable to hold that, pace Rowe, AI is the
stronger argument.
But now C2 also entails that A4 is unsound. Though A4 purports to establish
that minor deities are possible, C2 is incompatible with that conclusion. And,
that being so, why should we not argue as follows: "Since A4 is demonstrably
unsound, it is likely that A2, which is very similar to A4, is also unsound"?
The answer is that it is evident that the premisses of A2-type arguments have
some kind of epistemic relevance to the conclusion that it is a conceptual truth
that what their subject term refers to is a possible being. Now my refutation of
A4 makes it clear that the envisaged premisses do not deductively entail the
contemplated conclusion, since premisses (2) and (3) of A4 are true, even though
conclusions (4) and (5) are false. Of course, we could convert A4-type arguments
into deductive ones by adding the premiss that what their subject term refers to
is possible. But this would be to fail to take seriously the fact that the premisses
of A2 (and A4) are epistemically relevant to their conclusions. If those premisses
require to be strengthened by a supplementary premiss which is identical with
the conclusion, then obviously they have no epistemic bearing whatever on the
conclusion. However, it seems very unlikely that there is some other suppressed
premiss which would convert the envisaged arguments into deductively valid
ones. But, again, the envisaged premisses are relevant to their conclusions. It
follows that the premisses in question establish a prima facie case for their
conclusions, in the sense that it is up to the critic of a given A2-type argument
to show that its conclusion is false. Now, as we have seen, the critic of A4 can
shoulder this burden. However, it is far from clear how the opponent of A2 can
overthrow the prima facie case which premisses (1) and (2) establish for the
conclusion that it is a conceptual truth that God is possible. 12 In brief, it does
not follow just from the demonstrable fact that A4 is unsound that A2 is unsound
as well.
My point here can be restated as follows: (1) and (2) of A2 are clearly epistemically relevant to (3). Now there are two ways of interpreting this: a) They
establish a prima facie case for (3). b) They establish only a partial case for
(3), in the sense that they need to be supplemented by a third premiss, which
renders the argument deductively valid. However, the most likely candidate for
such a premiss is the claim that God is possible. And if that is what the argument
requires, then (what is palpably false) premisses (1) and (2) have after all no
epistemic bearing on (3). It follows that a) (directly above) is true and that it is
up to the critic of A2 to shoulder the burden of providing evidence that God is
not a possible being.
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Here someone may object that A2 is clearly not an inductive argument and
that, hence, if it is really not a deductive argument (with a suppressed premiss)
either, then it falls outside the category of sound arguments. But I think that
Roderick Chisholm has made it plain that there are--{)r, anyway, may well
be-sound arguments which are neither deductive nor inductive in character.
(See, for example, Chisholm's Theory of Knowledge, second edition, especially
the last chapter. 13)
IV

I shall end with a brief discussion of one further objection to A2: "The mere
unsupported claim that something, X, is possible is-when X is neither something
which is picked out by a complex mathematical or logical formula'4 and when
X is not just obviously impossible (like a square circle )-prima facie acceptable,
i.e., there is an onus on the person who denies it to defend his denial. It follows
that the premisses of A2 entail something that we can know to be true independently of those premisses, namely, that the proposition that God is possible is
prima facie acceptable. And it follows in tum that those premisses are superfluous. "
One answer to this objection is that it is not clear that the proposition that
"God exists" is possibly true is more like the proposition that, e.g., "Ronald
Reagan exists" is possibly true than like the proposition that some complex
mathematical formula is possibly true. After all, the proposition that God exists
is, if possibly true, then true, and in that respect it strongly resembles mathematical
formulae. Hence, it is not clear that "God is possible" has prima facie acceptability
independently of any arguments for that claim.
Secondly, I have argued in Chapter 6 of my book, Theism,15 that, in the
absence of an argument for God's possibility, there are some criticisms of the
claim that God is possible, about the cogency of which rational people can
disagree. But A2 is, I think, a strong enough argument for its conclusion that it
requires a strong (rationally constraining) argument to overthrow it (at least as
strong an argument as the one which overthrows A4). And the best criticisms
of God's possibility with which I am acquainted are not that strong.
Thirdly, the answer to the question "What makes Dore think that he has
considered all the best criticisms?" is that A] gives us reason to think that no
devastating, but presently unthought of, criticisms will be forthcoming-more
reason than we would have if we were entitled only to make the undefended
claim that God is a possible being.
Vanderbilt University
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NOTES
1. Haldane and Ross, The Philosophical Works ofDescartes, Vol. 1 (New York: Dover Publications,
Inc. 1955), p. 181.
Anthony Kenny points out that Descartes explained to a critic that, by "a mountain without a
valley," he meant an uphill slope without a downhill slope. Anthony Kenny, Descartes, A Study of
His Philosophy (New York: Random House, 1968), p. 156.
2. For the meaning of "broadly logical," see Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (Oxford:
The Clarendon Press, 1974), p. 2.

3. See Chapter 5 of my book, Theism, which is forthcoming at D. Reidel at the time of this writing.
4. Chapter 6 of Theism.
5. The various defenses of A2 which follow in this section are very similar to defenses of Al in
Chapter 7, Section III of Theism.
6. When any sentence expresses a truth, this is at least in part explicable by reference to the
concepts which it expresses.
7. I am assuming (what seems to me true) that S5 is the most intuitive way of dealing with logical
possibility and necessity. See my defense of this assumption in Chapter 5 and the Appendix of Theism.
8. The argument can be found in The Existence and Nature of God, Alfred J. Freddoso, ed. (Notre
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), pp. 151-154.
9. E.g., "Round squares are round" expresses a truth only if it means "If anything is a round
square, then it is round." However, this expresses a vacuous truth because of the necessary falsehood
of its antecedent. So it does not, despite appearances, express a conceptual truth.
10. Still, this is not, perhaps, a trivial conclusion. For it is compatible with the claim that Al gives
us some reason to believe that God exists.
II. Theists have traditionally held that God, a supremely perfect being, possesses many more
perfections than we can specify. And, indeed, it looks as though it is a necessary truth that if God
exists, then this is the case. For it looks as if, given that we can specify all God's perfections, then
a more perfect being is possible, namely, one whose perfections exceed our capacity to specify them.

12. For a discussion of arguments which purport to show that God is not possible, see Chapter 6
of Theism.
13. Roderick Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge, 2nd edition, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall,
1977).
Chisholm contemplates the possibility that there is non-deductive and non-inductive evidence for
God's existence (not just for his possibility). But, it is not clear what such evidence would look like.
14. If there is a prima facie case for these being possibly true, then, given S5, there is a prima
facie case for all mathematical and logical formulae being true simpliciter. It goes without saying,
however, that this is false. There is an onus on the mathematician and the logician to prove their
theorems.
15. See footnote (3).

